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Abstract The aim of this paper consists of constructing accessibility measures to
the nodes of directed graphs using methods of Game Theory. Since digraphs without a
predefined game are considered, the main part of the paper is devoted to establish con-
ditions on cooperative games so that they can be used to measure accessibility. Games
that satisfy desirable properties are called test games. Each ranking on the nodes is
then obtained according to a pair formed by a test game and a solution defined on
cooperative games whose utilities are given on ordered coalitions. The solutions pro-
posed here are extensions of the wide family of semivalues to games in generalized
characteristic function form.
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1 Introduction
A directed graph is a mathematical model consisting of a finite set N of nodes and
a family D of ordered pairs of these nodes so-called oriented edges. In our model,
if an oriented edge links two nodes, we will say that the second node of the edge is
accessible from the first one. A node can also be accessible from another node if it
is possible to reach the former from the latter using a path formed by a sequence of
consecutive oriented edges.
When all oriented edges are considered, the accessibility of a node depends, essen-
tially, on the length (number of edges) of all oriented paths arriving to it and on their
geometrical disposition. Both characteristics define the geometry of the connections
arriving to a given node and they must be considered to determine a measure of its
accessibility.
Economic, social or political situations where there exists an ordered relation among
pairs of their agents are usually modeled by means of directed graphs. So are hier-
archical structures in corporations or administrations, social networks with relations
not necessarily symmetric or web sites related with oriented links among them. In
these examples, a greater accessibility supposes a greater importance of the agent in
the corresponding node.
Directed graphs can also be used to describe a situation where a set of towns or
industrial installations are related by means of geographical networks and the commu-
nication channels have a predefined orientation. Once again, it is interesting to know
the importance of each agent according to its accessibility. Moreover, dominance situ-
ations can be modeled by directed graphs too. For instance, sport competitions, where
the result of each match is not a draw, allows to define an oriented edge that links both
players, from loser to winner.
In this paper, we give a measure of the accessibility of each node in a directed graph.
The main idea consists of considering the marginal contribution of each node to the
connection scheme described by the directed graph, i.e., we compare the different
geometries of the connections with a given node and without this node. Game Theory
has a long tradition in the treatment of marginal contributions. It suffices to remind that
two of the more known solution concepts for cooperative games, the Shapley value
(Shapley 1953) and the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf 1965; Owen 1975), are based on the
marginal contributions of the players.
We will use concepts of Game Theory that allow to ensure some accessibility char-
acteristics widely accepted. For instance, it seems convenient that the accessibility
measure does not depend on the label of each node; on the contrary, two nodes with a
same structure of oriented edges arriving to them should obtain the same accessibil-
ity. Also, inaccessible nodes should have null accessibility, whereas the accessibility
of a node should increase when a new edge arriving to it is added. These and other
properties must be preserved by any accessibility measure proposed.
Obviously, there are not predefined games on the nodes of directed graphs. There-
fore, our work presents two different aspects. On the one hand, the paper is devoted to
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determine conditions on the games which can be used to measure accessibility. Games
that satisfy desirable conditions will be called test games. On the other hand, we will
consider solution concepts based on marginal contributions to offer accessibility mea-
sures on directed graphs.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 contains technical informa-
tion about Game Theory in order to establish measures of the importance of the agents
in situations described by means of directed graphs, as well as some comments on
other methods in the literature approaching this kind of situations. In Sect. 3, basic
concepts about digraphs, about cooperative games, cooperative games defined over
ordered coalitions and their solutions are described. Section 4 is devoted to extending
a wide family of solutions to games where the information depends on the order of
its agents. The definition of accessibility of nodes and some first properties are then
given. In Sect. 5 the accessibility is determined over oriented paths, giving expressions
to calculate it explicitly. Section 6 relates the concept of accessibility over oriented
paths with a type of cooperative games, in such a way that the characteristics of one
game to be test game are stated. In Sect. 7, the solution that gives appropriate weights
over ordered coalitions is chosen. Two examples are presented in Sect. 8. Finally, in
Sect. 9, a summary of the process is presented.
2 Cooperative games and directed graphs: related work
Cooperative games with transferable utility have been proved to be appropriate math-
ematical tools to model many situations coming from different areas of science like
economics, social sciences or political sciences. The information needed in any con-
crete situation to define the corresponding cooperative game is the utility that each
group of agents or coalition is able to obtain. All these data are gathered in the charac-
teristic function. Solution concepts for cooperative games are located very close to the
games because, by means of these solutions, the position of each agent in the scenario
described by the game is highlighted.
The Shapley (1953) and the Banzhaf (1965)—Owen (1975) values have a prom-
inent position among the set of solutions for cooperative games. Both solution con-
cepts provide to every player a unique numerical assignment that allows to measure
its importance in the game. In both cases, the marginal contribution of the players,
that is, the difference between the utility that a coalition can obtain with or without
a fixed player, is essential to determine the assignment. Nevertheless, there is an out-
standing difference between them. The Shapley value is an efficient solution, in the
sense that the sum of all the players’ assignments coincides with the utility that the
grand coalition can get, whereas the Banzhaf value is not.
In an economical context, or even better, in a monetary context, the efficiency is a
desirable property that enables a suitable distribution of the total utility, and it gives to
the solutions an intuitive idea easy to understand. But in other circumstances, where
efficiency is not essential, other non-efficient solution concepts can be considered.
For instance, in reliability theory, to determine the importance of each component in
a system according to its reliability; in networks, to establish the importance of their
nodes related through oriented or unoriented links; in sports competition, to determine
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a ranking among players or teams and, in general, to analyze all situations where exists
an open classification based on paired comparisons among its agents. In addition, every
non-efficient allocation rule on games provides a measure of the relative importance
among the players according to its particular criteria of assignment, so that, in a next
step, if necessary, the global utility can be distributed among the players proportion-
ally to its relative importance (van der Laan and van den Brink 1998). This scheme is
also adequate for power indices, including the Banzhaf index, where there is a unit of
utility and the allocations are measures of the relative importance among the players
in the simple game.
To deal with the problem of measuring the importance of the nodes in directed
graphs, we can think, in a broad sense, in solutions that assign to each player an
expected value of their marginal contributions to the coalitions, according to proba-
bilistic distributions that give a specific weight depending on the cardinality of each
coalition. These solutions form a wide family known as semivalues (Dubey et al. 1981),
and it contains the Banzhaf and Shapley values, being the latter the only efficient one.
The information gathered by the characteristic function of a classical cooperative
game is the utility of all the subsets of players without considering the order in which
the coalition is formed. If the situation you want to describe depends on the order of
presentation of its agents, the concept of characteristic function must be extended to
ordered coalitions. In the literature, games defined on ordered coalitions are called
games in generalized characteristic function form. In turn, solutions for this class of
games must be considered, as Nowak and Radzik (1994) or Sanchez and Bergantiños
(1997) did, modifying in a convenient way the Shapley value. Here, following a par-
allel process, we consider the extension of semivalues to the set of cooperative games
defined over ordered coalitions.
We will use the above mentioned concepts of Game Theory to establish mechanisms
to obtain measures of the accessibility of each node in oriented networks modelled by
directed graphs or, simply, digraphs. There are several works in the literature that have
studied this subject following different approaches. In general, the results depend on
the fixed criteria used to obtain the solution. An important group of solutions are based
in iterative methods, following Wei (1952) or Kendall (1955). These kind of methods
were intensively analyzed by Laslier (1997) for the particular case of tournaments,
that is, digraphs where for each pair of nodes there is only one of the two possible ori-
ented edges between them. More recently, Herings et al. (2005) provided a procedure
to measure the power of the nodes in a digraph using a mixture between the iterative
and the axiomatic methods.
Concepts and methods of Game Theory have also been used to establish a rank
on the nodes of a digraph. Among others, we can remind the papers of Laffond et al.
(1993), where a symmetric game of zero sum is associated to situations described
as tournaments, Gilles et al. (1992) or Derks and Gilles (1995) who consider games
modified by structures of hierarchy which are modelled as digraphs. In general, in
these types of works, a game is defined from the oriented structure, or the given game
is modified taking into account this structure. Our approach in this paper is different:
without giving an axiomatic and inflexible system of properties, we want to determine
the features that a cooperative game should satisfy in order to offer an acceptable
ordering of the nodes of a digraph with respect their accessibility, without any a priori
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game defined on the nodes of the oriented network. The desirable features give rise
to properties of the games and these are obtained taking into account the marginal
contributions of each node to the set of ordered coalitions.
Other situations involving undirected or directed graphs have also been modeled
by cooperative games where the edges play the role of players in an appropriate game.
Bachrach and Rosenschein (2007) use the Banzhaf index in network flow games,
whereas several power indices, including Shapley and Banzhaf, are analyzed by Aziz
et al. (2009) on spanning connectivity games, where the computational complexity
of computing the power of the edges in undirected and unweighted multigraphs is
examined.
All works using cooperative games to measure the importance of the agents in the
games require, in addition, convenient solution concepts according to the characteris-
tic function that gathers the information related to the modeled situation. In the present
work, the wide family of semivalues is extended to games in generalized characteristic
function form, since the order of players in the coalitions is essential in our model. We
will determine the accessibility of nodes selecting a pair given by a game satisfying
the required assumptions and a semivalue chosen following some criteria about its
coefficients defined on ordered coalitions, which are interpreted as a probabilistic dis-
tribution over them. We call test games the cooperative games that could be selected
to measure the accessibility. This terminology was already considered in Amer et al.
(2007) to give a measure of the nodes in a digraph using the Shapley value. This work
generalizes the previous case and, also, widens the class of test games.
3 Cooperative games modified by directed graphs
A digraph is a pair (N , D) where N is a finite set of nodes and D is a binary relation
defined on N . Each pair (i, j) ∈ N × N corresponds to an oriented edge that links
node i to node j . Since we consider digraphs without loops, the complete digraph is
(N , DN ) with DN = N × N \ {(i, i) / i ∈ N }. Fixed N , we identify each digraph
(N , D) with the binary relation D. In this way, all digraphs on N are the subsets
D ⊆ DN .
A cooperative game with transferable utility or TU game is a pair (N , v), where
N is a finite set of players and v : 2N → R is the so-called characteristic function,
which assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S), the worth of coalition S,
and satisfies the natural condition v(∅) = 0.
By G N we denote the set of all TU games on N . For a given set of players N , we
identify each game (N , v) with its characteristic function v. A TU game v is mono-
tonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N ; a TU game v is called symmetric if the
utilities only depend on the coaliton size, i.e., v(S) = f (s), where s = |S|, and a TU
game v is zero-normalized when v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
When the utilities also depend on the orders of the players within each coalition, we
need to consider TU games in generalized characteristic function form as they were
introduced by Nowak and Radzik (1994) and by Sanchez and Bergantiños (1997).
Formally, for each nonempty subset S ⊆ N , we denote by H(S) the set of all orders
of the elements in S. The elements T ∈ H(S), ∅ = S ⊆ N , will be called ordered
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coalitions. A TU game in generalized characteristic function form or, for short, a
generalized TU game is a pair (N , v) where N is a finite set of players and v is a
function that assigns to every T ∈ H(S), ∅ = S ⊆ N , a real number v(T ). By
definition H(∅) = {∅} and v(∅) = 0 is imposed. We denote the set of all generalized
TU games on N by N .
For a nonempty ordered coalition T = (i1, i2, . . . , is) ∈ H(S), we say that i j+1
is the consecutive element of i j in T , for 1 ≤ j ≤ s − 1 (or i j is the previous ele-
ment of i j+1). A subset of consecutive elements in T, Q = (i p, i p+1, . . . , i p+u) with
1 ≤ p ≤ p + u ≤ s, is called a consecutive subcoalition of T .
Definition 3.1 Given a digraph D defined on N , a consecutive subcoalition Q =
(i p, i p+1, . . . , i p+u) of T = (i1, i2, . . . , is) is a connected consecutive subcoalition
according to the digraph D if, and only if, u = 0 or (i j , i j+1) ∈ D for j = p, . . . , p+
u−1. If, in addition, (i) p = 1 or (i p−1, i p) ∈ D and (ii) p+u = s or (i p+u, i p+u+1) ∈
D, we say that Q is a maximal connected consecutive subcoalition according to D.
Definition 3.2 Let v and D be a TU game and a digraph respectively defined on N .
The game v modified by digraph D is the generalized TU game defined by
vD(T ) =
∑
Q∈T/D
v(Q′) ∀T ∈ H(S), ∀S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
where T/D denotes the set of maximal connected consecutive subcoalitions of T
according to digraph D, and Q′ denotes the (non-ordered) coalition in N formed with
the elements of the ordered subcoalition Q.
Remark 3.3 If v is a symmetric TU game, for every modified game vD , the utilities of
all ordered coalitions only depend on the size of their respective maximal connected
consecutive subcoalitions according to digraph D: v(Q′) = f (q), where q = |Q′|.
Symmetric TU games will play an essential role in the development of the paper.
Example 3.4 We introduce three symmetric TU games whose utilities are obtained
from specific properties of the coalitions related with their respective sizes.
(i) The conferences game. For every coalition S ⊆ N , the conferences game assigns
the number of subcoalitions in S with two or more players (conferences): v1(S) =
f1(s) = 2s − s − 1,∀S ⊆ N .
(ii) The pairs game. For every coalition S ⊆ N , the pairs game assigns the number
of subcoalitions in S with two players: v2(S) = f2(s) = s(s − 1)/2,∀S ⊆ N .
(iii) The lengths game. For every coalition S ⊆ N , the lengths game assigns the length
of a minimal path involving all players as nodes: v3(S) = f3(s) = s −1 if S = ∅
and v3(∅) = 0.
Game v1 and game 2v2—under the name of messages game– were considered by
Gómez et al. (2001), where social networks without direction were studied. All three
games are zero-normalized.
A solution or a value on the set of TU games G N is a function  : G N → RN
which assigns to every game v a vector [v] with components i [v] for all i ∈ N . It
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represents a method to measure the negotiation strength of the players in the game. The
vector space RN is called the allocation space. Semivalues as solution concepts were
introduced by Dubey et al. (1981) by means of four axioms. A solution ψ : G N → RN
is a semivalue iff it satisfies the following properties:
A1. Linearity. ψ[λu + μv] = λψ[u] + μψ[v] for all u, v ∈ G N and λ,μ ∈ R.
A2. Anonymity. ψπ i [πv] = ψi [v] for all v ∈ G N , i ∈ N and π permutation of N ,
where game πv is defined by (πv)(π S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N .
A3. Positivity. If game v is monotonic, then ψi [v] ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
A4. Projection. ψi [v] = v({i}) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ AN , where AN denotes the
set of additive games in G N , i.e., games v such that v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ) if
S ∩ T = ∅ and S, T ⊆ N .
In the same paper, another characterization of semivalues by using weighting coeffi-
cients and marginal contributions is provided.
Theorem 3.5 (Dubey et al. 1981) (a) For every weighting vector (ps)ns=1 such that
n∑
s=1
(
n − 1
s − 1
)
ps = 1 and ps ≥ 0 for s = 1, . . . , n, (1)
the expression
ψi [v] =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps+1[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ G N , (2)
where s = |S|, defines a semivalue ψ on G N .
(b) Conversely, every semivalue on G N is of this form, i.e., there exists a one-to-one
map between the semivalues on G N and the vectors (ps)ns=1 verifying conditions (1).
The marginal contribution of a player i ∈ N to a coalition S ∪{i}, with S ⊆ N \{i},
is the difference v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). Expression (2) shows that the allocation to each
player by a semivalue ψ on G N is an average of the marginal contributions to the
coalitions to which it belongs, where the weighting coefficients ps+1 only depend on
the coalition size.
Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value φ, for which ps =
[n(n−1
s−1
)]−1, and the Banzhaf value β, for which ps = 21−n . The Shapley value φ is
the only efficient semivalue, in the sense that ∑i∈N φi [v] = v(N ) for every v ∈ G N .
It is worthy of mention that these two classical values are defined for each N .
A parametric family of semivalues can be considered for each N . Given a real num-
ber α ∈ (0, 1), the binomial semivalue ψα (Puente 2000; Giménez 2001) is defined
on the set of TU games G N by its weighting coefficients: pα,s = αs−1(1 − α)n−s for
s = 1, . . . , n. It is the unique family of semivalues whose weights are in geometric
progression: pα,s+1/pα,s = α/(1−α), s = 1, . . . , n−1. In addition, n different bino-
mial semivalues form a reference system on the set of all semivalues on G N (Amer
and Giménez 2003), so that, every semivalue can be written as a linear combination
of them. The Banzhaf value is the binomial semivalue for α = 1/2.
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In a game with n players, one can think that the coalitions containing a given player
are formed in a random manner with only one condition: coalitions with equal size
have equal probability. This probabilistic distribution is collected by the coefficients
of a weighting vector and this vector is univocally related with one specific semivalue.
The above is a probabilistic approach to semivalues. From another view point, one can
propose a system of weights so that each marginal contribution is weighted accord-
ing to the coalition size. Condition (1) gathers all possible distributions of weights:
weight p1 for single coalitions, p2 for coalitions with two players, and so on until pn
for the grand coalition N . It is a constructive approach to semivalues. In this context,
a prominent place is occupied by the Banzhaf value, since all marginal contributions
are equally weighted by 1/2n−1, the inverse of the number of coalitions containing a
given player.
4 Extended semivalues and directed graphs
The solutions for TU games provided by the wide family of semivalues on G N can be
extended to solutions for generalized TU games like the classical Shapley value was
extended by Nowak and Radzik (1994) for all games in N .
Definition 4.1 Let ψ be a semivalue defined on G N with weighting vector (ps)ns=1.
The extension to the set of generalized TU games N of semivalue ψ is the allocation
rule defined by
ψi [v] =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps+1
s!
∑
T∈H(S)
[v((T, i)) − v(T )] for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ N ,
(3)
where (T, i) is the ordered coalition obtained from T adding element i at its end.
Remark 4.2 By abuse of notation, we use the same letter ψ for the extended semi-
value on N . It is clear that every extended semivalue ψ satisfies similar properties to
A1–A4 but in the context of generalized TU games.
A1’. Linearity. ψ[λu + μv] = λψ[u] + μψ[v] for all u, v ∈ N and λ,μ ∈ R.
A2’. Anonymity. ψπ i [πv] = ψi [v] for all v ∈ N , i ∈ N and π permutation of N ,
where game πv is defined by (πv)(πT ) = v(T ) for all T ∈ H(S) and S ⊆ N .
A3’. Positivity. A game v ∈ N is monotonic if v((T1, T2)) ≥ v(T1), for all T1 ∈
H(S1), T2 ∈ H(S2) and S2 ⊆ N \ S1. If game v ∈ N is monotonic, then
ψi [v] ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
A4’. Projection. ψi [v] = v({i}) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ AN , where AN denotes the set
of additive games in N , i.e., games v such that v((T1, T2)) = v(T1) + v(T2)
for all T1 ∈ H(S1) and T2 ∈ H(S2), if S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and S1, S2 ⊆ N .
According to property A2, when a symmetric TU game is defined on a set N , the
allocations to all players provided by each semivalue on G N coincide. Nevertheless,
in the generalized TU game vD obtained from the modification of v due to a digraph
123
Accessibility measures to nodes of directed graphs 113
D with set of nodes N , in general, vD(T1) = vD(T2) for T1, T2 ∈ H(S) and S ⊆ N .
Then, the allocations to the nodes of N as players in game vD according to an extended
semivalue are, in general, not coincident.
The allocation to each node through a symmetric TU game v modified by a digraph
D depends on the geometry of the connections described by the modified game vD
and, also, on the amounts that weigh the marginal contributions of each node; these
amounts are related with the weighting vector of each semivalue. Both characteris-
tics—geometry and weights—allow us to introduce several rankings among the nodes
of digraphs as we establish in the following definition.
Definition 4.3 Let v be a symmetric TU game defined on N and let ψ be a semivalue
defined on G N with weighting vector (ps)ns=1. Given a digraph D with set of nodes N ,
the accessibility of node i ∈ N according to game v and semivalue ψ is the allocation
obtained by player i in the modified game vD according to the extended semivalue ψ
defined on N :
ai [D; v,ψ] := ψi [vD] =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps+1
s!
∑
T∈H(S)
[vD((T, i)) − vD(T )] for all i ∈ N .
(4)
Example 4.4 On the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3}, given the digraph defined by D =
{(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)}, the modified game obtained from the symmetric
TU game v1 introduced in Example 3.4 is defined as follows:
vD1 (i) = 0 ∀i ∈ N , vD1 (1, 3) = 0, vD1 (i, j) = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ D, vD1 (1, 3, 2)
= vD1 (2, 1, 3) = 1
and vD1 (i, j, k) = 4 ∀(i, j, k) ∈ H(N ), (i, j, k) = (1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3).
In turn, according to digraph D, the modified games of games v2 and v3 in Exam-
ple 3.4 take the same values as game vD1 except:
vD2 (i, j, k) = 3, vD3 (i, j, k) = 2 ∀(i, j, k) ∈ H(N ), (i, j, k) = (1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3).
Independently of the above games, we can consider several semivalues on three-
player games. For instance: the Shapley value φ with weighting vector (p1, p2, p3) =
(1/3, 1/6, 1/3), the Banzhaf value β with weights ps = 1/4, s = 1, 2, 3, the binomial
semivalue ψ1/3 whose weighting vector is (p1, p2, p3) = (4/9, 2/9, 1/9) and, the
binomial semivalue ψ2/3 with (p1, p2, p3) = (1/9, 2/9, 4/9).
Table 1 shows some allocations to the nodes according to the corresponding
extended semivalues and the modified games. The second column offers the allo-
cation and the third presents the percentage vector, to compare.
Several properties of the accessibility for specific selected games and all semivalues
are described in the next proposition. A node i in a digraph D is called inaccessible if
no other node j ∈ N can be found such that ( j, i) ∈ D. As it seems reasonable, the
accessibility of an inaccessible node takes null value, and the accessibility of a node
does not decrease when an edge arriving to the considered node is added.
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Table 1 Accessibility of the
nodes in digraph D ψ[vD ] (ψ1[vD], ψ2[vD ], ψ3[vD ]) %
φ[vD1 ] (4/3, 1, 2/3) (44.44, 33.33, 22.22)
φ[vD2 ] (1, 5/6, 1/2) (42.86, 35.71, 21.43)
β[vD1 ] (5/4, 1, 5/8) (43.48, 34.78, 21.74)
β[vD2 ] (1, 7/8, 1/2) (42.11, 36.84, 21.05)
β[vD3 ] (3/4, 3/4, 3/8) (40.00, 40.00, 20.00)
ψ1/3[vD1 ] (7/9, 2/3, 7/18) (42.42, 36.36, 21.21)
ψ2/3[vD2 ] (4/3, 10/9, 2/3) (42.86, 35.71, 21.43)
Proposition 4.5 Let D be a digraph defined on a finite set N (D ⊆ DN ). For every
semivalue ψ defined on G N :
(i) if v ∈ G N is a zero-normalized TU game and i ∈ N is an inaccessible node in
D, then ai [D; v,ψ] = 0;
(ii) if an edge leaving a node i is added, then ai [D ∪ (i, j); v,ψ] = ai [D; v,ψ], for
every TU game v ∈ G N ;
(iii) if v ∈ G N is a monotonic and zero-normalized TU game, and an edge arriving
to a node i is added, then ai [D ∪ ( j, i); v,ψ] ≥ ai [D; v,ψ];
(iv) the accessibility in the complete digraph DN equals the payoff by the selected
semivalue: ai [DN ; v,ψ] = ψi [v] for all i ∈ N, for every TU game v ∈ G N .
Proof (i) If i ∈ N is an inaccessible node in D, vD((T, i))−vD(T ) = v({i}) = 0
for all T ∈ H(S) and all S ⊆ N \ {i}, of where, by Eq. (4), ai [D; v,ψ] = 0.
(ii) Fixed an ordered coalition T ∈ H(S) and S ⊆ N \ {i}, vD∪(i, j)((T, i)) −
vD∪(i, j)(T ) = vD((T, i)) − vD(T ), since the maximal connected coalitions
containing node i at its end remain unaltered when edge (i, j) is added to
digraph D. Then, ai [D ∪ (i, j); v,ψ] = ai [D; v,ψ].
(iii) Now, we only consider coalitions S ⊆ N \{i} with j ∈ S, and ordered coalitions
T ∈ H(S) whose last element is node j . For these ordered coalitions, when
edge ( j, i) is added to digraph D,
vD∪( j,i)((T, i)) − vD∪( j,i)(T ) = v(Q j ∪ {i}) − v(Q j ) ≥ 0
= vD((T, i)) − vD(T ),
where Q j denotes the (non-ordered) coalition formed by the nodes belonging to
the maximal ordered subcoalition of T according to digraph D containing node
j . The inequality derives from monotonicity of game v, whereas the condition
of zero-normalized implies the last equality.
For the remaining coalitions, vD∪( j,i)((T, i)) − vD∪( j,i)(T ) = vD((T, i)) −
vD(T ), and the inequality ai [D ∪ ( j, i); v,ψ] ≥ ai [D; v,ψ] holds for ( j, i) ∈
D.
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(iv) For the complete digraph DN , all ordered coalitions are connected, so that
∑
T∈H(S)
[vDN ((T, i)) − vDN (T )] = s! [v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] ∀S ⊆ N \ {i},
and then, ai [DN ; v,ψ] = ∑S⊆N\{i} ps+1[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] = ψi [v] for all
i ∈ N .
unionsq
Remark 4.6 (a) In addition to the condition of zero-normalized, strictly monotonic
TU games (v(S) < v(T ) whenever S ⊂ T ⊆ N ) and regular semivalues
(weighting coefficients ps > 0 for s = 1, . . . , n) allow us to establish that only
inaccessible nodes obtain null accessibility, according to Eq. (4).
(b) From (iii), zero-normalized strictly monotonic TU games and regular semivalues
also guarantee an increase of the accessibility for a node i when a new edge ( j, i)
is added.
(c) According to (iv), given a semivalue ψ acting on the set of TU games G N ,
the concept of accessibility in a digraph offers an extension of the concept of
solution defined by the considered semivalue.
(d) All statements in the above Proposition have been proved using the marginal
contributions of each node to the ordered coalitions. This procedure allows us
to differentiate the contribution of the modified game vD to the accessibility
with respect to the contribution due to the selected semivalue ψ . Now, we will
generalize this work method.
Definition 4.7 Let v be a TU game defined on a finite set N and let D be a digraph
with set of nodes N . The vector of marginal contributions for a node i ∈ N according
to game v modified by digraph D is
mi (v
D) = (mi,1(vD), mi,2(vD), . . . , mi,n(vD))
where each component is defined by
mi,s(v
D) =
∑
S′⊆N\{i}:|S′|=s−1
∑
T∈H(S′)
[vD((T, i)) − vD(T )] for s = 1, . . . , n.
(5)
The expression of the accessibility given by Eq. (4) for each node i ∈ N in a digraph
D ⊆ DN can be rewritten in the following way:
ai [D; v,ψ] = ψi [vD] =
n∑
s=1
ps
(s − 1)!
∑
S′⊆N\{i}:|S′|=s−1
∑
T∈H(S′)
[vD((T, i)) − vD(T )].
(6)
On the other hand, from the weighting vector (ps)ns=1 of a semivalue ψ defined on
G N , we can define the weighting vector of the extended semivalue ψ defined on the
set of generalized games N by
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ω(ψ) =
(
p1
0! ,
p2
1! , . . . ,
pn
(n − 1)!
)
(7)
and then, the accessibility for node i in digraph D can be expressed as a scalar product:
ai [D; v,ψ] = ω(ψ) · mi (vD). (8)
The contribution of semivalue ψ to the accessibility of node i is collected by the
weighting vector ω(ψ), whereas vector mi (vD) summarizes the geometry of digraph
D and also the marginal contributions of node i according to game v.
5 Accessibility decomposition
In this section we want to offer a systematic procedure of computation for the acces-
sibility of the nodes in directed graphs based on the calculus over oriented paths,
considered as elementary digraphs.
On a set of nodes N , a digraph P included in DN is called an oriented path if
P = {(i1, i2), (i2, i3), . . . , (im−1, im)} with i1, i2, . . . , im ∈ N and i j = ik if j = k.
For short, we denote it by Pi1i2...im−1im .
Definition 5.1 Given a digraph D ⊆ DN and a node i ∈ N , we define digraph Di ]
as the union of all maximal oriented paths contained in D with last element node i .
Example 5.2 On the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, given the digraph defined by
D = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 2)},
we have:
D1 ] = P241 ∪ P2341 D2 ] = P3412 ∪ P1342
D3 ] = P2413 ∪ P4123 ∪ P423 D4 ] = P124 ∪ P134 ∪ P1234
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Lemma 5.3 Let D be a digraph defined on the set of nodes N and let v be a TU game
defined on N. For the marginal contributions it is verified:
(i) mi (vD) = mi (vDi ]) for all i ∈ N,
(ii) for every pair of paths P and P ′ with a same last node i ,
(a) if P ∩ P ′ does not have any connected component containing node i , then
mi (v
P∪P ′) = mi (vP ) + mi (vP ′)
(b) if P ∩ P ′ has one connected component containing node i, (P ∩ P ′)i , then
mi (v
P∪P ′) = mi (vP ) + mi (vP ′) − mi (v(P∩P ′)i ).
Proof (i) It is a direct consequence of property (ii) in Proposition 4.5.
(ii) When we compute the vector of marginal contributions for a modified game
vD according to expression (5), the differences vD((T, i)) − vD(T ), T ∈
H(S′), S′ ⊆ N \ {i}, only depend on the last maximal connected component
in the ordered coalition T according to digraph D, because this component is
the unique one that it is modified by the adjunction of node i at its end. Thus,
expression (a) easily follows, whereas for expression (b), it is enough to con-
sider that the common connected component containing node i and so-called
(P ∩ P ′)i is computed twice in the right hand, so that, it has to be discounted
one time; this is obtained subtracting mi (v(P∩P
′)i ). Note that (P ∩ P ′)i also is
an oriented path with last node i . unionsq
The above Lemma shows that the marginal contributions of all nodes can be reduced
to marginal contributions of last nodes in oriented paths. In this way, by the symmetry
property, given a digraph defined on a set N with n nodes, it suffices to know n − 1
vectors of marginal contributions for each symmetric TU game v modified by oriented
paths:
m1(v
Pn...1), m1(v
Pn−1...1), . . . , m1(v
P21).
For simplicity of notation, we have chosen node 1 as last node in all oriented paths.
The next propositions offer explicit expressions for these vectors of marginal contri-
butions, where Vn,k will denote the number of ways of obtaining an ordered subset of
k elements from a set of n elements, i.e., Vn,k = n!/(n − k)!.
Proposition 5.4 Let v be a symmetric and zero-normalized TU game defined on N,
i.e., v(S) = f (s) ∀S ⊆ N (s = |S|) and f (1) = 0. If Pn...1 is an oriented path
joining all nodes in N, then the marginal contributions of node 1 in game v modified
by Pn...1 are given by
m1,1(v
Pn...1) = 0; m1,2(vPn...1) = f (2);
m1,k(v
Pn...1) = f (k) − f (k − 1) +
k−1∑
j=2
(n − j − 1)Vn− j−1,k− j−1[ f ( j) − f ( j − 1)],
(9)
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for k = 3, . . . , n − 1, and
m1,n(v
Pn...1) = f (n) − f (n − 1) +
n−2∑
j=2
(n − j − 1)(n − j − 1)![ f ( j) − f ( j − 1)].
Proof The marginal contribution of node 1 with size 1 is m1,1(vPn...1) = vPn...1(1) =
f (1) = 0, whereas m1,2(vPn...1) = vPn...1(2, 1) − vPn...1(1) = f (2) − f (1) = f (2).
For each marginal contribution of a given size k = 3, . . . , n − 1, we consider
ordered coalitions with cardinality k − 1 not containing node 1. Only one of these
coalitions, (k, k − 1, . . . , 2), adding node 1 at its end is connected by Pn...1, so that it
leads to the difference f (k) − f (k − 1) in (9).
The remaining differences in (9), f ( j)− f ( j −1), for j = 2, . . . , k −1, appear so
many times as ordered coalitions with size k−1 have a maximal connected component
of size j when node 1 is added at its end. Only the ordered coalition ( j, j − 1, . . . , 2)
allows us to obtain this connected component and, at the same time, the previous node
can not be j + 1: this occurs n − j − 1 times. Finally, each ordered coalition with
size k − 1 is completed by adding at its beginning k − j − 1 nodes selected among
the remaining n − j − 1 nodes in N : this happens Vn− j−1,k− j−1 times. Expressions
in (9) are proved.
In a similar way, the marginal contribution of node 1 and size n can be obtained for
game v modified by Pn...1. unionsq
Proposition 5.5 Let v be a symmetric and zero-normalized TU game as defined in
Proposition 5.4. If Pq...1 is an oriented path involving some nodes in N (2 ≤ q < n),
then the marginal contributions of node 1 in game v modified by Pq...1 are given by
m1,k(v
Pq...1) = m1,k(vPn...1), for k = 1, . . . , q;
m1,k(v
Pq...1) =
q−1∑
j=2
(n − j − 1)Vn− j−1,k− j−1[ f ( j) − f ( j − 1)]
+ Vn−q,k−q [ f (q) − f (q − 1)], for k = q + 1, . . . , n − 1, (10)
and m1,n(vPq...1) = m1,n−1(vPq...1).
Proof It is quite close to the proof of Proposition 5.4. unionsq
Example 5.6 On the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3, 4} we introduce the conferences game
defined by v(S) = f (s) = 2s − s − 1 ∀S ⊆ N . In order to obtain all vectors of
marginal contributions for this game v modified by any digraph defined on N , three
vectors of marginal contributions are needed:
m1(v
P4321) = (0, 1, 4, 8), m1(vP321) = (0, 1, 4, 4) and m1(vP21) = (0, 1, 2, 2).
We now consider digraph D = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 2)} ⊆
DN and, for each node in N , we determine its vector of marginal contributions for
game v modified by D.
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For node 1, because D1 ] = P2341 ∪ P241, we have:
m1(v
D) = m1(vD1 ]) = m1(vP2341) + m1(vP241) − m1(vP41)
= (0, 1, 4, 8) + (0, 1, 4, 4) − (0, 1, 2, 2) = (0, 1, 6, 10).
Similar computations follow for the remaining nodes:
m2(v
D) = m2(vD2 ]) = m2(vP1342) + m2(vP3412) = (0, 2, 8, 16);
m3(v
D) = m3(vD3 ]) = m3(vP2413) + m3(vP4123) + m3(vP423) − m3(vP23)
= (0, 2, 10, 18);
m4(v
D) = m4(vD4 ]) = m4(vP1234) + m4(vP134) − m4(vP34) + m4(vP124)
= (0, 2, 10, 14).
Remark 5.7 Expressions in Propositions 5.4 and 5.5 allow us to know the marginal
contributions for the last node according to symmetric TU games modified by oriented
paths. From property (i) in Lemma 5.3, the marginal contributions of intermediate
nodes can be reduced to marginal contributions of last nodes:
mik (v
Pi1 ...ik ...im ) = mik (v(Pi1 ...ik ...im )ik ]) = mik (vPi1 ...ik ).
Remark 5.8 Consider, for instance, the unions of the oriented paths D3 ] and D4 ] in
Example 5.2: D3 ] = P2413∪ P4123∪ P423 and D4 ] = P124∪ P134∪ P1234. Colloquially
speaking, the structure of D3 ] can be obtained from the structure of D4 ], replacing an
oriented path with 3 nodes –P124– by an oriented path with 4 nodes –P2413–.
More precisely, let π be a permutation of N . Given a digraph D with edges
(i, j) i, j ∈ N , i = j , the digraph D transformed by π is π(D), whose edges are
(π(i), π( j)) for all (i, j) belonging to D. Digraphs D and π(D) are isomorphic: they
only differ on the label of their respective nodes. According to the above consideration,
it is easy to see that there exists a permutation π defined on N so that D3 ] ⊃ π(D4 ]).
The above comparison can be extended to all pairs of distinct unions of oriented
paths Di ], i = 1, 2, 3, 4, in Example 5.2. We have,
D3 ] ⊃ π(D2 ]), D3 ] ⊃ π(D1 ]) and D4 ] ⊃ π(D1 ]),
where it is understood that each permutation π is adequate to the studied comparison.
This remark leads us to the following definition.
Definition 5.9 Let D be a digraph with set of nodes N . Node i is structurally more
accessible than node j in digraph D ⊆ DN iff there exists a permutation π of N with
π( j) = i so that Di ] ⊃ π(D j ]).
From now on, we will use this notation: given two vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) and
b = (b1, . . . , bn) belonging to Rn , we will say that a ≥ b iff ai ≥ bi ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
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Proposition 5.10 Let D be a digraph defined on a finite set N (D ⊆ DN ). For every
symmetric and monotonic TU game v ∈ G N , if node i is structurally more accessible
than node j in digraph D, then ai [D; v,ψ] ≥ a j [D; v,ψ] for every semivalue ψ
defined on G N .
Proof By the symmetry property, the vector of marginal contributions for every node
is obtained from a family of n − 1 vectors of marginal contributions of last nodes in
oriented paths. Then, by Lemma 5.3: mi (vD) = mi (vDi ]) ≥ m j (vD j ]) = m j (vD),
where the inequality is due to the monotonicity property in case Di ] ⊃ π(D j ]), with
π permutation of N .
According to Eq. (8), the accessibility of a node is obtained from the vector of
marginal contributions by means of a scalar product with a weighting vector, then
the above inequalities on the marginal vectors lead us to similar inequalities on the
accessibilities, ai [D; v,ψ] ≥ a j [D; v,ψ] for every semivalue ψ defined on G N . unionsq
Note that inclusion Di ] ⊃ π(D j ]) in Definition 5.9 is strict. In case of equality,
Di ] = π(D j ]), with π permutation of N , we can say that nodes i and j are equally
accessible and their respective accessibilities coincide for all semivalues on G N .
According to the result obtained in the previous Proposition, it seems that nothing
depends on the game and on the semivalue selected to measure accessibility. On the
contrary, a greater structural accessibility of a node with respect to other node always
results in a greater measure of accessibility, as it seems reasonable. The introduction
of games and semivalues can change the relationship between measures of accessibil-
ity, but without changing the structural dominance of a node over another. However,
not all pairs of nodes will be comparable according to the relation structurally more
accessible than.
6 Oriented paths and convexity
Definition 6.1 A cooperative TU game v on N is said to be convex if v(S1 ∪ S2) ≥
v(S1) + v(S2) − v(S1 ∩ S2) ∀S1, S2 ⊆ N .
Lemma 6.2 Let v be a symmetric TU game defined on N , v(S) = f (s) ∀S ⊆ N with
s = |S|. Convexity for symmetric game v is equivalent to conditions
f (s) − f (s − 1) ≥ f (s − 1) − f (s − 2), 2 ≤ s ≤ n = |N |. (11)
Proof For a symmetric game, one can write the condition of convexity in terms of
function f : f (s1 + s2 − s12) ≥ f (s1) + f (s2) − f (s12), where s1 = |S1|, s2 =
|S2|, s12 = |S1 ∩ S2| and s1 + s2 − s12 = |S1 ∪ S2|.
Now, chosen a coalition Q in N with s − 2 players, we consider S1 = Q ∪ {i} and
S2 = Q ∪ { j}, i, j ∈ N \ Q, i = j . Since |S1| = |S2| = s − 1, |S1 ∩ S2| = s − 2
and |S1 ∪ S2| = s, the above expression for a symmetric game in terms of function f
leads us to formula (11). Conversely, from expression (11), we have:
f (s) − f (s − k) ≥ f (s − 1) − f (s − k − 1) ≥ f (s − 2) − f (s − k − 2)
≥ · · · ≥ f (s − k′) − f (s − k − k′)
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for 1 ≤ k′ < k + k′ ≤ s. Then, identifying s = s1 + s2 − s12, k = s1 − s12 and
k′ = s2 − s12, we conclude that f (s1 + s2 − s12) − f (s2) ≥ f (s1) − f (s12). unionsq
In a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} where a symmetric and zero-normalized TU game v is
defined, we want to compare the marginal contributions of a given node when an edge
is added to an oriented path. To do so, we consider oriented paths Pq...1 and Pq+1...1
for 2 ≤ q ≤ n − 1 and we focus on node 1. According to Proposition 5.5:
m1,k(v
Pq...1) = m1,k(vPq+1...1) = m1,k(vPn...1), k = 1, . . . , q.
The following proposition shows a relationship between the remaining marginal con-
tributions and the convexity of game v.
Proposition 6.3 Let v be a symmetric, monotonic and zero-normalized TU game on
N. For all oriented paths Pq...1, 2 ≤ q ≤ n − 1, involving some nodes in N,
m1,k(v
Pq...1) ≤ m1,k(vPq+1...1), ∀k = q + 1, . . . , n ⇔ v is a convex game.
Proof Game v is defined by v(S) = f (s) ∀S ⊆ N and f (1) = 0. We first con-
sider the above inequalities in case q = 2, . . . , n − 2. Here, the conditions in the
statement reduce to n − q − 1 inequalities, since, by Proposition 5.5, m1,n(vPq...1) =
m1,n−1(vPq...1) and also for vPq+1...1 . Now, each inequality can be developed by using
again expressions (10) derived in Proposition 5.5,
m1,k(v
Pq...1) ≤ m1,k(vPq+1...1), k = q + 1, . . . , n − 1
⇔
q−1∑
j=2
(n − j − 1)Vn− j−1,k− j−1[ f ( j) − f ( j − 1)]+ Vn−q,k−q [ f (q)− f (q − 1)]
≤
q∑
j=2
(n − j − 1)Vn− j−1,k− j−1[ f ( j) − f ( j − 1)] + Vn−q−1,k−q−1
×[ f (q + 1) − f (q)]
⇔ Vn−q,k−q [ f (q) − f (q − 1)]
≤ (n − q − 1)Vn−q−1,k−q−1[ f (q)− f (q − 1)]+ Vn−q−1,k−q−1[ f (q + 1)− f (q)]
⇔ (n − q)[ f (q)− f (q − 1)] ≤ (n − q − 1)[ f (q)− f (q − 1)]+ f (q + 1)− f (q),
and we arrive at
f (q + 1) − f (q) ≥ f (q) − f (q − 1), q = 2, . . . , n − 2. (12)
In case q = n − 1, only one inequality appears in the statement: m1,n(vPn−1...1) ≤
m1,n(vPn...1). As before, it is not difficult to see that this inequality is equivalent to
condition f (n) − f (n − 1) ≥ f (n − 1) − f (n − 2). Conditions in expression (12) in
addition to this last inequality are equivalent to convexity, since the first condition in
expression (11) is verified by monotonicity and zero-normalized properties of game
v: f (2) − f (1) ≥ f (1) − f (0) ⇔ f (2) ≥ 0. unionsq
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According to this last Proposition and its previous comment, Eq. (8) allows us to
formulate the following result.
Theorem 6.4 For every symmetric, monotonic and zero-normalized TU game defined
on N and every semivalue defined on G N , by adjunction of previous nodes to oriented
paths on N, the accessibility of their last nodes does not decrease if and only if the
selected TU game is convex.
In the previous statement, all inequalities can be replaced by strict inequalities. Con-
vexity can be replaced by strict convexity, f (s)− f (s−1) > f (s−1)− f (s−2), 2 ≤
s ≤ n = |N | and we can only consider regular semivalues (weighting coefficients
ps > 0, 1 ≤ s ≤ n). Under these conditions, an increase of accessibility of the last
nodes in oriented paths by adjunction of previous nodes is equivalent to strict convexity
of the TU game.
Remark 6.5 From the beginning, to define accessibility of nodes in digraphs, we have
considered symmetric TU games, with the aim that the allocations depend on the
geometry of the oriented network and not on the label of each node.
Other desired properties are satisfied asking for some characteristics on the consid-
ered TU games. For instance, (i) null accessibility for inaccessible nodes is obtained by
zero-normalized property of the game, (ii) no negative (positive) accessibility for the
remaining nodes, by (strict) monotonicity, (iii) not decrease (increase) of accessibility
for a node when an edge arriving to this node is added, also by (strict) monotonicity.
Now, it seems interesting to obtain an increase of accessibility of the last nodes
in oriented paths by adjunction of previous nodes, so that the strict convexity of the
selected games is also demanded.
All these required properties can be summarized for the symmetric games v ∈ G N
defined by means of v(S) = f (s) ∀S ⊆ N according to three conditions:
f (1) = 0; f (2) > 0; f (s) − f (s − 1) > f (s − 1) − f (s − 2), 3 ≤ s ≤ n.
(13)
Example 6.6 Example 3.4 revisited. The conferences game and the pairs game respec-
tively defined by v1(S) = f1(s) = 2s − s − 1 and v2(S) = f2(s) = s(s − 1)/2
are strictly convex games. Nevertheless, the lengths game v3(S) = f3(s) = s − 1
(v3(∅) = 0) as linear game is not strictly convex. In particular, this last game is
the unique linear game verifying the condition of zero-normalization, except for a
multiplicative constant. According to the previous remark, the two first games are
convenient to compute weighted accessibility of nodes in oriented graphs.
Lemma 6.7 Let v ∈ G N be a symmetric, zero-normalized and linear TU game. Then,
the vector of marginal contributions of the last node in game v modified by any oriented
path does not depend on the considered path.
Proof To prove the statement we consider the linear game v(S) = f3(s) = s −1, s =
1, . . . , n, defined on N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. As last node we take node 1 and as family
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of oriented paths Pq...1 with q = 2, . . . , n. The expressions that we obtain for all
q = 2, . . . , n are the following:
m1,1(v
Pq...1) = 0; m1,2(vPq...1) = 1; m1,k(vPq...1) = Vn−2,k−2, k = 3, . . . , n.
We begin with path Pn...1. According to Proposition 5.4, m1,1(vPn...1) = 0, m1,2(vPn...1)
= 1 and, for k = 3, . . . , n:
m1,k(v
Pn...1) = 1 +
k−1∑
j=2
(n − j − 1)Vn− j−1,k− j−1
= 1 + 1
(n − k)!
k−1∑
j=2
[
(n − j)! − (n − j − 1)!
]
= (n − 2)!
(n − k)! = Vn−2,k−2.
In a similar way, m1,n(vPn...1) = 1 + ∑n−2j=2(n − j − 1)(n − j − 1)! = (n − 2)!.
For the remaining paths Pq...1 with q = 2, . . . , n −1, according to Proposition 5.5,
m1,k(vPq...1) = m1,k(vPn...1) for k = 1, . . . , q, whereas, for k = q + 1, . . . , n − 1:
m1,k(v
Pq...1) =
q−1∑
j=2
(n − j − 1)Vn− j−1,k− j−1 + Vn−q,k−q
= 1
(n − k)!
⎧
⎨
⎩
q−1∑
j=2
[
(n − j)! − (n − j − 1)!
]
+ (n − q)!
⎫
⎬
⎭ = Vn−2,k−2.
Finally, m1,n(vPq...1) = m1,n−1(vPq...1) = Vn−2,n−3 = (n − 2)!. unionsq
Example 6.8 We consider D = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 2)} ⊆
DN as defined in Example 5.6, with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and the lengths game v(S) =
f3(s) = s −1 for s = 1, . . . , 4. All the vectors of marginal contributions that we need
to compute the accessibility of any node in D coincide: m1(vP4321) = m1(vP321) =
m1(vP21) = (0, 1, V2,1, V2,2) = (0, 1, 2, 2).
As we have worked in Example 5.6, the vectors of marginal contributions for each
node in D can be computed from the above vectors:
m1(v
D) = (0, 1, 2, 2) and m j (vD) = (0, 2, 4, 4) for j = 2, 3, 4.
The vector of marginal contributions of each node is a multiple of vector (0, 1, 2, 2)
and the factor exactly coincides with the number of edges arriving at the considered
node. Therefore, given any semivalue ψ defined on four-player games by means of
its weighting vector (p1, p2, p3, p4), we compute the accessibility of the nodes in
oriented graph D according to Eq. (8):
a1[D; v,ψ] = p2 + p3 + 13 p4; a j [D; v,ψ] = 2p2 + 2p3 +
2
3
p4, j = 2, 3, 4.
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The percentage vector of accessibility, (14.29, 28.57, 28.57, 28.57), does not depend
on the selected semivalue. Its information is only taken from the number of edges
arriving to each node.
The above example can be easily generalized to every digraph and every linear
game, where linear is employed as a synonym of a multiple of the lengths game
defined by f3(s) = s − 1. If we choose a linear game as a test game, the action of the
selected semivalue to compute accessibility is disabled. For this reason, the families
of test games that we propose do not contain linear games.
Definition 6.9 Let G N be the set of TU games with n players. We consider as test
games to compute accessibility in digraphs with n nodes two families of symmetric
games:
(i) games of monomial type, vr (S) = fr (s) = sr − 1,∀S ⊆ N with r > 1;
(ii) games of exponential type, vr (S) = fr (s) = rs−1 − 1,∀S ⊆ N with r > 1.
In both cases, it is assumed that the empty coalition obtains zero.
Each one of the games belonging to these families satisfies conditions (13) and it
can be used as a test game. Moreover, every convex and linear combination of them can
be employed. Note that games v2(S) = f2(s) = s2 −1 and v2(S) = f2(s) = 2s−1 −1
are quite close to the pairs game v2(S) = f2(s) = s(s − 1)/2 and the conferences
game v1(S) = f1(s) = 2s − s − 1, respectively. In both cases, the linear component
has been removed.
7 Choosing semivalues
So far we have focused our attention on the cooperative games suggested to determine
the accessibility of the nodes in a digraph. We will now pay attention on the semivalues
involved according to its weighting coefficients. Given a semivalue ψ defined on the
set G N of TU games with n players, each coefficient ps weighs marginal contributions
to coalitions of size s, for s = 1 to s = n. To compute accessibility, we have extended
each semivalue to the generalized games in N . The marginal contributions to ordered
coalitions of size s are now weighted according to coefficients ps/(s −1)!, as we have
stated in Eq. (6).
Our purpose consists of choosing the coefficients of a semivalue defined on the set
G N of classical TU games so that the corresponding extended semivalue on N has
a suitable distribution of weights on the ordered coalitions. That is, choosing in an
appropriate way coefficients ps , so that ps/(s−1)! respond to our claims. For instance,
suppose that, emulating to the Banzhaf value on classical TU games, we want to weigh
every marginal contribution to the ordered coalitions with equal coefficients. In the
following Definition, we introduce such a semivalue; before, a Lemma is needed.
Lemma 7.1 The number of nonempty ordered coalitions in a set N is given by
|{T ∈ H(S) | ∅ = S ⊆ N }| = e n! − 1, for |N | = n ≥ 2,
where x denotes the integer part of a positive number x.
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Proof It suffices to write the number of nonempty ordered coalitions according to
each size and then consider the remainder term in the McLaurin development of ex ,
n∑
s=1
(
n
s
)
s! = −1 + n!
n∑
s=0
1
(n − s)! ≤ −1 + n!
[
n∑
s=0
1
(n − s)! +
eξ
(n + 1)!
]
= e n! − 1,
where 0 < ξ < 1. The addition of eξ /(n +1) leads us to the inequality in the previous
expression. Since 0 < ξ < 1, we have 1 < eξ < 3, and then eξ /(n+1) < 1 for n ≥ 2.
This guarantees that the number of nonempty ordered coalitions in N is e n! − 1. unionsq
Definition 7.2 On the set G N of TU games with n players, we define the semivalue
β˜ “emulating to the Banzhaf value” by means of the following weighting coefficients:
p˜s = (s − 1)!e (n − 1)! for s = 1, . . . , n.
It is not difficult to check that the above coefficients p˜s satisfy conditions (1), so
that β˜ belongs to the set of semivalues on G N . When this semivalue is extended to
generalized cooperative games in N , all coefficients weighting each marginal con-
tribution to all ordered coalitions are coincident: ps/(s − 1)! = ps′/(s′ − 1)! for all
1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ n. The extended semivalue of β˜ plays on N a role similar to the one
played by the Banzhaf value β on G N . This motivates its definition.
The above procedure for the Banzhaf value can be extended to every semivalue ψ
on G N , as we state in the next Definition.
Definition 7.3 Let ψ be a semivalue on G N with weighting vector (ps)ns=1. We define
the semivalue ψ˜ “emulating to the semivalue ψ” by means of the following weighting
coefficients:
p˜s = 1
(n − 1)!∑ns=1 ps/(n − s)!
(s − 1)!ps for s = 1, . . . , n.
After some computations, one can see that coefficients p˜s also satisfy conditions (1)
characterizing semivalues on G N . In addition, ps′ p˜s/(s − 1)! = ps p˜s′/(s′ − 1)! for
all 1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ n. This guarantees that the proportion between the coefficients weight-
ing ordered coalitions of sizes s and s′ according to the extended semivalue of ψ˜ on
games in N equals the proportion between the coefficients weighting non-ordered
coalitions of sizes s and s′ according to semivalue ψ defined on G N .
8 Two detailed examples
Below, two examples are offered. In each one, after the introduction of a directed graph
D, several steps follow: (i) decomposition of D as the union of all maximal oriented
paths with a same last node; (ii) selection of some test games and determination of
the corresponding vector of marginal contributions for each node; (iii) introduction
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of several semivalues according to suitable distributions of weights on the ordered
coalitions and computation of accessibility in several cases and (iv) comments on the
obtained results.
Example 8.1 On the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, we consider again the digraph
defined by D = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 2)}.
(i) For each i ∈ N , the respective unions of maximal oriented paths Di ] (see
Example 5.2) are:
D1 ] = P241 ∪ P2341 D2 ] = P3412 ∪ P1342
D3 ] = P2413 ∪ P4123 ∪ P423 D4 ] = P124 ∪ P134 ∪ P1234
(ii) We choose as test games defined on N games v2(S) = f2(s) = s2 − 1 and
v2(S) = f2(s) = 2s−1 − 1,∀S ⊆ N (S = ∅). According to Propositions
5.4 and 5.5, we obtain the vectors of marginal contributions for these games
modified by oriented paths:
m1(v
P4321
2 ) = (0, 3, 8, 10), m1(vP3212 ) = (0, 3, 8, 8),
m1(v
P21
2 ) = (0, 3, 6, 6);
m1(v
P4321
2 ) = (0, 1, 3, 5), m1(v
P321
2 ) = (0, 1, 3, 3),
m1(v
P21
2 ) = (0, 1, 2, 2).
For each test game, the three considered vectors of marginal contributions deter-
mine all vectors of marginal contributions for each node. According to Lemma 5.3,
for game v2 we have:
m1(v
D
2 ) = m1(vD1 ]2 ) = (0, 3, 8, 10) + (0, 3, 8, 8) − (0, 3, 6, 6) = (0, 3, 10, 12);
m2(v
D
2 ) = (0, 6, 16, 20); m3(vD2 ) = (0, 6, 18, 22) and m4(vD2 ) = (0, 6, 18, 20).
In a similar way, for game v2: m1(vD2 ) = (0, 1, 4, 6); m2(vD2 ) = (0, 2, 6, 10);
m3(vD2 ) = (0, 2, 7, 11) and m4(vD2 ) = (0, 2, 7, 9).
(iii) The first semivalue that we propose to compute the accessibility is β˜, the semi-
value emulating to the Banzahf value. Because e 3! = 16, its weighting vector
is ( p˜s)4s=1 = (1/16, 1/16, 1/8, 3/8) so that all weighting coefficients for the
extended semivalue of β˜ take value 1/16.
Other semivalues that we propose are of binomial type. The coefficients of the
binomial semivalue ψ1/3 on the set of TU games with four players, (ps)4s=1 =
(8/27, 4/27, 2/27, 1/27), form a geometric progression with ratio 1/2. Follow-
ing the procedure introduced in Definition 7.3, the weighting vector of semivalue
ψ˜1/3 that emulates to ψ1/3 is given by ( p˜s)4s=1 = (4/19, 2/19, 2/19, 3/19), so that
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Table 2 Accessibility measures of the nodes in digraph D
Solution vector Percentage vector
a[D; v2, β˜] (1.5625, 2.6250, 2.8750, 2.7500) (15.92, 26.75, 29.30, 28.03)
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] (1.1579, 2.0000, 2.1579, 2.1053) (15.60, 26.95, 29.08, 28.37)
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/4] (0.8846, 1.5641, 1.6667, 1.6410) (15.37, 27.17, 28.95, 28.51)
a[D; v2, β˜] (0.6875, 1.1250, 1.2500, 1.1250) (16.42, 26.87, 29.85, 26.87)
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] (0.4737, 0.7895, 0.8684, 0.8158) (16.07, 26.79, 29.46, 27.68)
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/4] (0.3462, 0.5897, 0.6410, 0.6154) (15.79, 26.90, 29.24, 28.07)
eig+(A) (0.3392, 0.5335, 0.4999, 0.5920) (17.26, 27.15, 25.45, 30.14)
HLT(D) (0.4802, 0.8502, 0.8396, 0.9207) (15.57, 27.57, 27.00, 29.86)
the weighting vector of the extended semivalue ψ˜ defined on generalized games of
N —as denoted in Eq. (7)—is
ω(ψ˜1/3) = 138 (8, 4, 2, 1) .
Notice that the components of this vector are also in geometric progression of ratio
1/2.
We now consider the binomial semivalue ψ1/4 with weighting vector (ps)4s=1 =
(27/64, 9/64, 3/64, 1/64). A similar procedure leads us to the weighting vector of
semivalue ψ˜1/4, ( p˜s)4s=1 = (9/26, 3/26, 1/13, 1/13), and then,
ω(ψ˜1/4) = 178 (27, 9, 3, 1) .
At this stage, we can offer several measures of the accessibility for the nodes in
digraph D by combining the marginal contributions due to the selected test games
and the weighting vectors defined on the ordered coalitions, according to the extended
semivalues we have considered. Table 2 provides these measures, obtained by means
of Eq. (8).
The two last rows in Table 2 contain classical solutions for the problem of establish-
ing a ranking among the nodes of an oriented network modeled by means of a digraph
D. On the one hand, to solve the problem, it is considered matrix A = (ai j ), where
ai j takes value 1 if ( j, i) belongs to digraph D and value 0 otherwise. The solution is
obtained according to the idea due to Wei (1952) and Kendall (1955), where the ranking
among the nodes is based on the eigenvector of matrix A whose components are all pos-
itive; it has been denoted with eig+(A). On the other hand, H LT (D) denotes the rank-
ing obtained according to the solution proposed by Herings, van der Laan and Talman
(see Herings et al. 2005), essentially a mixture between axiomatic and iterative method.
(iv) Following the results provided in Table 2, several comments can be offered. The
three first rows correspond to measures of accessibility using test game v2. For
all considered semivalues, the ranking among the nodes remains unaltered: this is
a direct consequence of the vectors of marginal contributions according to game
v2 modified by digraph D, since they satisfy
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m3
(
vD2
)
≥ m4
(
vD2
)
≥ m2
(
vD2
)
≥ m1
(
vD2
)
.
Just as in Proposition 5.10, the above inequalities lead us to similar inequalities
on the accessibilities for every semivalue. Nevertheless, note that the differences
between the allocations to nodes 3 and 4 decrease as α decreases in the considered
semivalues (β = ψ1/2). This fact happens because the only difference between
vectors m3(vD2 ) and m4(vD2 ) appears in their last component and the weight for
this component decreases when α decreases in ψ˜α .
We now pay attention to the three following rows of Table 2, related with
test game v2. Since it is possible to make four structural comparisons in digraph
D, D3 ] ⊃ π(D4 ]), D3 ] ⊃ π(D2 ]), D3 ] ⊃ π(D1 ]) and D4 ] ⊃ π(D1 ]), where it
is understood that each permutation π is adequate to the corresponding compari-
son, then, according to Proposition 5.10, these inclusions lead us to the inequalities
a3[D; v,ψ] ≥ a4[D; v,ψ], a3[D; v,ψ] ≥ a2[D; v,ψ], a3[D; v,ψ] ≥ a1[D; v,ψ]
and a4[D; v,ψ] ≥ a1[D; v,ψ] for every test game v on N and every semivalue ψ on
G N . In particular, this is valid for test game v2 and all considered semivalues.
However, the pairs D1 ], D2 ] and D2 ], D4 ] are not comparable. Then, when our test
games are introduced, a different behavior for each pair of nodes occurs. For nodes 1
and 2,
m2(v
D
2 ) ≥ m1(vD2 ) and m2(vD2 ) ≥ m1(vD2 ),
so that, for all semivalues on G N , the accessibility of node 2 exceeds that of node
1, according to games v2 and v2. This way, all accessibility measures of node 2 are
greater than the respective allocations to node 1, as we can see in Table 2
Finally, for nodes 2 and 4, our test games lead us to two different situations:
(a) m4(v
D
2 ) ≥ m2(vD2 ) whereas (b) m4(vD2 ) ≥ m2(vD2 ), m2(vD2 ) ≥ m4(vD2 ).
Test game v2 shows the accessibility of node 4 as more favorable than the accessibil-
ity of node 2, and then, for every semivalue, the accessibility measure of node 2 will
always be larger than the corresponding of node 4.
On the contrary, test game v2 does not offer a strict comparison between both vec-
tors of marginal contributions. One can see the structure of D2 ] as better than the
structure of D4 ] (two oriented paths with four nodes form D2 ] whereas three oriented
paths form D4 ], two with three nodes and one with four nodes). On the other hand,
D4 ] can be more adequate than D2 ], if we consider the number of oriented paths in
their respective structures. Test game v2 is able to highlight these different aspects.
Then, choosing several semivalues, the measure of accessibility for both nodes can be
modulate. In particular, from rows 4, 5 and 6 in Table 2:
a2[D; v2, β˜] = a4[D; v2, β˜], a2[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] < a4[D; v2, ψ˜1/3],
a2[D; v2, ψ˜1/4] < a4[D; v2, ψ˜1/4].
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It is easy to check that choosing a semivalue ψ˜α with α > 1/2, the accessibility for
nodes 2 and 4 satisfy a2[D; v2, ψ˜α] > a4[D; v2, ψ˜α].
The ranking offered by game v2 and semivalues ψ˜1/3 and ψ˜1/4 coincides, for nodes
2 and 4, with the ranking obtained by the classical solution based on the eigenvector
of matrix A and also by the solution H LT (D). For game v2 and all considered semi-
values, a similar coincidence occurs for nodes 2 and 4. Nevertheless, node 3, our best
node in an structural sense, does not obtain the first position in the eigenvector method
neither in the HLT-method.
Example 8.2 A competition digraph
A set of teams playing in a sports competition produces a series of dominance relations
based on the result of each match. It seems thus natural that all obtained results are
collected in a dominance digraph, so-called competition digraph D. We want to focus
our attention in the tournaments, where each match has a winner and a loser. Here, the
relation of dominance can be clearly translated in an oriented edge: if player j wins the
match against i , then (i, j) ∈ D. Nevertheless, this definition of competition digraph
is not unique; one can see a more general definition in Van den Brink and Borm (2002),
precisely in the case in which a draw can be a possible outcome of the match.
Basketball competitions are played in tournaments. The example we present comes
from the European Basketball Championship (EuroBasket 2009), where, in the Qual-
ifying Round, group F consisted of six players: Slovenia (1), Turkey (2), Serbia (3),
Spain (4), Poland (5) and Lithuania (6). The relation of results of the 15 matches is:
1 wins to 2, 3, 5 and 6; 2 wins to 3, 4, 5, and 6; 3 wins to 4, 5 and 6; 4 wins to 1,
5 and 6; and, finally, 5 wins to 6. Fiba Europe (Erobasket 2009 Organizer) ranks the
teams with 2 points for a win and 1 point for a loss. According to this system, vector
(9, 9, 8, 8, 6, 5) collects the official allocation to the teams of group F.
Now, this situation arising from a sports competition will be analyzed applying our
accessibility measures. We first consider the competition digraph on the set of teams
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}:
D = {(1, 4), (2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 2), (4, 3), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (6, 1),
(6, 2), (6, 3), (6, 4), (6, 5)}
(i) For each team i ∈ N , the unions of maximal oriented paths Di ] are:
D1 ] = P654321 ∪ P64321 ∪ P65321 ∪ P6321 ∪ P65421 ∪ P6421 ∪ P6521 ∪ P621
∪P65431 ∪ P6431 ∪ P6531 ∪ P631 ∪ P651 ∪ P61,
D2 ] = P651432 ∪ P61432 ∪ P65432 ∪ P6432 ∪ P6532 ∪ P632 ∪ P653142 ∪ P63142
∪P65142 ∪ P6142 ∪ P6542 ∪ P642 ∪ P652 ∪ P62,
D3 ] = P652143 ∪ P62143 ∪ P65143 ∪ P6143 ∪ P6543 ∪ P643 ∪ P653 ∪ P63,
D4 ] = P653214 ∪ P63214 ∪ P65214 ∪ P6214 ∪ P65314 ∪ P6314 ∪ P6514
∪P614 ∪ P654 ∪ P64,
D5 ] = P65 and D6 ] = ∅.
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(ii) We now introduce two test games and compute the vectors of marginal contribu-
tions for the last node in the oriented paths. For test game v2(S) = f2(s) = s2 −1:
m1(v
P6...1
2 ) = (0, 3, 14, 44, 90, 92), m1(vP5...12 ) = (0, 3, 14, 44, 90, 90),
m1(v
P4...1
2 ) = (0, 3, 14, 44, 88, 88), m1(vP3212 ) = (0, 3, 14, 42, 84, 84)
and m1(vP212 ) = (0, 3, 12, 36, 72, 72).
With these five vectors, all vectors of marginal contributions for the nodes in D can
be obtained. For node 1:
m1(v
D
2 ) = m1(vD1 ]2 ) = m1(vP6...12 ) + 4m1(vP5...12 ) + 4m1(vP4...12 ) − m1(vP3212 )
−4m1(vP212 )
= (0, 12, 64, 210, 430, 432).
Similar computations lead us to the vectors for the remaining nodes.
m2(v
D
2 ) = (0, 12, 62, 202, 416, 420), m3(vD2 ) = (0, 9, 44, 140, 286, 288),
m4(v
D
2 ) = (0, 9, 46, 150, 308, 310), m5(vD2 ) = (0, 3, 12, 36, 72, 72)
and m6(vD2 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
We repeat the same procedure for test game v2(S) = f2(s) = 2s−1 − 1.
m1(v
P6...1
2 ) = (0, 1, 5, 17, 38, 46), m1(v
P5...1
2 ) = (0, 1, 5, 17, 38, 38),
m1(v
P4...1
2 ) = (0, 1, 5, 17, 34, 34), m1(v
P321
2 ) = (0, 1, 5, 15, 30, 30)
and m1(vP212 ) = (0, 1, 4, 12, 24, 24).
From the above vectors,
m1(v
D
2 ) = (0, 4, 24, 90, 200, 208), m2(vD2 ) = (0, 4, 23, 85, 194, 210),
m3(v
D
2 ) = (0, 3, 16, 56, 124, 132), m4(vD2 ) = (0, 3, 17, 63, 142, 150),
m5(v
D
2 ) = (0, 1, 4, 12, 24, 24) and m6(vD2 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
(iii) At this stage, we shall now proceed to choose semivalues. The first selected semi-
value will be β˜ which emulates to the Banzahf value. In games with six players,
e 5! = 326 so the weighting coefficients of β˜ take values ps = (s − 1)!/326
for s = 1, . . . , 6 and the unique weighting coefficient of the extended semivalue
on games with ordered coalitions is 1/326.
The second selected semivalue is ψ˜1/3, which emulates to the binomial semivalue
ψ1/3. We proceed as in Example 8.1, but now with n = 6. The weighting vector of
ψ1/3 is
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(ps)6s=1 = (32/243, 16/243, 8/243, 4/243, 2/243, 1/243).
Therefore, the weighting vector of the semivalue ψ˜1/3, obtained according to Defini-
tion 7.3 is
( p˜s)6s=1 = (32/872, 16/872, 16/872, 24/872, 48/872, 120/872).
And, hence, the weighting vector of the extended semivalue ψ˜ defined on generalized
games of N is
ω(ψ˜1/3) = 1872 (32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1) .
For this competition digraph, we offer four measures of accessibility for the six
nodes as rankings of the teams they represent. Table 3 shows the solution vectors
computed from test games v2 and v2 and semivalues β˜ and ψ˜1/3. At its end, three rows
have been added: the first one contains the classical solution obtained by the eigen-
vector method, the second one presents the solution due to Herings, van der Laan and
Talman, while the third one shows the official allocation given by Fiba Europe.
For comparison, all seven rankings are normalized in percentage vectors and pre-
sented in Table 4.
Table 3 Accessibility measures of the teams in competition digraph D
Solution vector
a[D; v2, β˜] (3.5215, 3.4110, 2.3528, 2.5245, 0.5982, 0.0000)
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] (3.2523, 3.1514, 2.1972, 2.3372, 0.5780, 0.0000)
a[D; v2, β˜] (1.6135, 1.5828, 1.0153, 1.1503, 0.1994, 0.0000)
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] (1.4037, 1.3601, 0.8945, 0.9977, 0.1927, 0.0000)
eig(A) (0.6256, 0.5516, 0.3213, 0.4484, 0.0000, 0.0000)
HLT(D) (0.9541, 0.9160, 0.6422, 0.6868, 0.1667, 0.0000)
Fiba Europe (9.0000, 9.0000, 8.0000, 8.0000, 6.0000, 5.0000)
Table 4 Normalized rankings for the teams in competition digraph D
Percentage vector
a[D; v2, β˜] (28.38, 27.49, 18.96, 20.35, 4.82, 0.00)
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] (28.24, 27.37, 19.08, 20.29, 5.02, 0.00)
a[D; v2, β˜] (29.01, 28.46, 18.26, 20.68, 3.59, 0.00)
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] (28.95, 28.05, 18.45, 20.58, 3.97, 0.00)
eig(A) (32.13, 28.33, 16.50, 23.03, 0.00, 0.00)
HLT(D) (28.35, 27.21, 19.08, 20.41, 4.95, 0.00)
Fiba Europe (20.00, 20.00, 17.78, 17.78, 13.33, 11.11)
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(iv) A digraph competition with 6 teams allows us a total of 15 paired comparisons
among them. In our comment we will pay special attention to the pairs of teams
they obtain a same outcome made in the official classification.
Teams 1 and 2 are not structurally comparable in competition digraph D. Then, we
compare vectors of marginal contributions. For test game v2,
m1(v
D
2 ) = (0, 12, 64, 210, 430, 432) ≥ (0, 12, 62, 202, 416, 420) = m2(vD2 ),
so that the ranking will be favorable to team 1 according to game v2 and all semivalues,
as can be seen in rows 1 and 2 of Table 3. Nevertheless, for test game v2, the vectors
of marginal contributions are not comparable:
m1(v
D
2 ) = (0, 4, 24, 90, 200, 208), m2(vD2 ) = (0, 4, 23, 85, 194, 210).
In despite, according to both selected semivalues, team 1 also exceeds team 2 (rows 3
and 4). Note that only the last component of vector m2(vD2 ) takes a greater value than
the corresponding one of vector m1(vD2 ). Selected semivalues β˜ and ψ˜1/3 are not able
to change the ranking among teams 1 and 2. It is easy to see that a semivalue with
almost all weight in the last weighting coefficient may be able to change the ranking
among both teams.
On the other hand, teams 3 and 4 are structurally comparable according to com-
petition digraph D, since there exists π permutation of N with D4 ] ⊃ π(D3 ]). In
this case, by Proposition 5.10, a4[D; v,ψ] ≥ a3[D; v,ψ] for every test game v and
every semivalue ψ defined on G N . Table 3 show this inequality for the selected games
and semivalues, where each row specifies a ratio for the accessibility measures among
teams 3 and 4, based on each selected pair of test game and semivalue.
In competition digraph D, an eigenvector with all positive entries for the corre-
sponding matrix A can not be found. We have selected, for comparison, an eigenvector
eig(A) with no negative entries. For teams 1 to 4, the ranking based on the eigenvec-
tor method coincides in all studied cases with our method based on test games and
semivalues. Also, our null player, team 6, obtains in all cases value 0, including null
entry of the considered eigenvector. Since team 5 is not a null player according to our
development, its accessibility measures are strictly positive, whereas the eigenvector
assigns null value to him. The eigenvector method offers to each node an allocation
proportional to the sum of allocations to the nodes that link to him; in digraph D, only
node 6 links to node 5 and then, the null allocation assigned to team 6 also induces
null allocation to team 5. Moreover, note the proximity between the solution offered
by the HLT-method and the accessibility of nodes obtained through game v2 and both
selected semivalues.
9 Concluding remark
Using techniques of Game Theory, several accessibility measures to the nodes of
directed graphs can be obtained. We have used cooperative games in generalized
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characteristic function form, since the treatment of oriented paths in digraphs requires
to consider ordered coalitions. The accessibility measures that we provided are based
on the choice of a pair consisting of a cooperative game, so-called test game, and
a solution for cooperative games selected from the wide family of semivalues. All
obtained measures for the nodes can be considered as exogenous procedures to com-
pute accessibility in a digraph. In this way, our method allows us to emphasize some
types of structural characteristics in the digraph and measure the position of its nodes
according to them.
The allocations to the nodes have been determined in two stages: (i) dealing with
the marginal contributions of each node, which depend on the digraph geometry and
on the utilities given by the proposed game and (ii) considering the weighting coeffi-
cients for the ordered coalitions, which come from the chosen semivalue. In a digraph
with n nodes, stage (i) reduces to obtain marginal contributions over n − 1 oriented
paths (the elementary digraphs). It is there where the properties that a game should
fulfill to be considered as a test game have been established. Stage (ii), strongly bound
with probabilistic distributions, allows constructing semivalues in such a way that the
weights over ordered coalitions correspond to desired criteria.
Every pair of test game and semivalue provides a measure of the accessibility giv-
ing an allocations vector over the nodes. In general, this allocation is not efficient. In
fact, the grand coalition’s utility does not have any special meaning in the digraph,
taking into account that the game is external to it. In order to make comparison among
allocations, in each example we use percentages vectors, in a similar way as van der
Laan and van den Brink (1998) considered the so-called share functions.
For a given digraph, the present work offers a family of rankings for the accessi-
bility of their nodes. If a node presents a better structurally position than another, all
rankings allocate a greater accessibility to the node in the better position, but each
selection of test game–semivalue modulates the ratio of the allocation according to
the characteristics of the selected pair. It is particularly interesting the case in which
nodes are not structurally comparable in the digraph. Now, the pair formed by test
game and semivalue is able to detect this situation, offering different rankings that
depend on the features collected by the selected pair.
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